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Abstract
Given the myriad of journal titles in economics and business administration, scholars can sometimes target
the wrong journal. This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications that
brings into the picture this type of informational friction. The key modelling device is a paper-to-journal
matching function, similar to the matching function traditional in labor economics. A equilibrium is
dened as a situation where both editors and authors implement their optimal publication strategies. The
model is then solved for the equilibrium submission fee, desk rejection rate and ratio between the number
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1 Introduction
The publication market can be dened as the place where scholars supply and editors demand
academic papers. An important characteristic of this market is the huge ows of papers written,
submitted, revised and rejected every year, ultimately leading to a relatively small number of
papers published. In the last twenty years, driven by a stronger institutional race for top research
positions in the now ubiquitous rankings, the number of scholars committed to research and the
number of submitted papers have increased dramatically (Bence and Oppenheim, 2004; Frey,
2009). For instance, the Editor Report 2010 of the American Economic Review states that the
number of submissions to the journal has increased from 641 in 1980 to 1398 in 2009 (for a stable
number of published papers).1
In turn, this change in volumes brought about several signicant changes in the organization of
the publication market: rstly, the number of journal titles has also increased, but at a smaller pace
than the number of submitted papers, leading to higher congestion. Secondly, while twenty years
ago almost no economic journal charged submission fees, these days submission fees are almost
generalized; they vary from modest amounts to quite substantial ones (some journals require now
submission fees as high as 250 $). Some authors have pointed out that editors would resort to
submission fees only to deter authors of low quality papers from submitting their work to their
journal (Leslie, 2005; Azar, 2006).2 Thirdly, more and more journals are implementing "desk-
rejection procedures", according to which the editor can decide to turn down a paper without
sending it to referees, if he considers that the paper does not t to the aim and scope of the
journal (or that the paper is really poorly written). The standard rationale is clearly stated in
the Editor Report 2010 of the American Economic Review :
Beginning in January 2006, the Editor and Coeditors have reserved the right to
1 The American Economic Review, Report of the Editor, January 2, 2010. See: www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php.
2 Wang (1997) analyzes in a similar way application fees in the labor market.
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return manuscripts to authors without referee review. The decision to return a man-
uscript without review is based upon a number of considerations, including expected
probability of meeting the standards of the Review, breadth of topic, interest to the
AER audience, and other factors.3
Our paper analyzes the publication market in a dynamic model with trade frictions that
explicitly brings into the picture submission fees and the desk-rejection phenomenon. One key
assumption is that academic journals are specialized or have their own philosophy. Therefore,
a good quality paper, well suited for one journal, might not match the editorial line of another
journal. In a world where the number of journal titles in business and economics counts in
hundreds, authors might target the wrong journal. If a paper does not match the editorial line of
journal, it will be desk-rejected; in the opposite case, it will be sent to referees for an assessment of
its quality. The traditional refereeing process is then represented in a simplied way, by considering
a xed probability of having a paper accepted for publication. Hence, in this paper we focus on
"horizontal" di¤erentiation between identically demanding journals. The quality of the papers is
not explicitly brought into the picture; the only assumption we made is that authors of a referee-
rejected paper realize that its quality is too low for the going standards and will not send it to
another journal.4 To the contrary, the author of a desk-rejected paper will submit it to another
journal, hoping for a better t.
As an original contribution, we introduce at the editor pre-screening level a matching function
that connects the number of successful matches to the total number of submitted papers and the
number of journal titles. For sure, in a market with horizontally di¤erentiated journals, the more
papers each journal gets, the larger the number of papers tted for that journal; the larger the
number of journals, the deeper their specialization (Frey et al., 2009), thus the better are chances
3 See for similar policies the Instruction to Authors web page of Econometrica, Journal of Monetary Economics
or the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
4 The structure of the problem would not change is we assume that the author submits a referee-rejected paper
to a nite number of journals before withdrawing it, but calculations would be more cumbersome.
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for an author to target the right journal.5 Our approach builds on the classical literature in
labor economics. In this eld, the matching function between rms and job-seekers, pioneered by
Pissarides (2000), connects the number of successful matches to the number of unemployed persons
and vacant jobs.6 A journal in the academic publication market is thus similar to a "large rm"
in the labor market framework, given that every journal publishes several papers every period.
Thus, the paper-to-journal matching function can be seen as a useful "macroeconomic" device,
able to describe in a simple way the informational frictions between authors and editors.
An equilibrium of this model is dened as a situation where both scholars and editors implement
their optimal plans, given the existing matching process and the socially determined rent-sharing
rule. The model has three key endogenous variables: the desk-rejection rate, the tension in the
publication market, dened as the ratio between the number of editors (journals) and the number
of authors (papers), and the submission fee. We show that the model presents a single equilibrium.
Comparative statics with parameters of the model can account for some of the recent trends in
the academic publication market. For instance, an increase in the scholarsintertemporal utility
from a published paper would lead to an increase in submission fees, in the number of submitted
papers and in the desk rejection rate.
While analyses of the academic publication market belong now to a well established eld of
research, there are not many theoretical analyses that take into account informational frictions
specic to this market. As a related work, we can refer to Besancenot et al. (2009) who worked
out an equilibrium search model, where authors submit papers and editors search for papers.
Editors can be either highly demanding, thus accepting only top papers with a small probability,
or tolerant, accepting all papers. In equilibrium, authors optimally decide whether to write high or
low quality papers. Lee (2009) argues that matching frictions are a key feature of the publication
5 This argument has been put forward by Stigler et al. (1995) in a di¤erent set-up. Taking the perspective of
scholars searching for new ideas, they argue that the normal reaction of congestion in publication market is journal
specialization; this process should reduce the readerse¤ort for identifying the relevant journals.
6 The substantial contribution of Dale Mortensen to this literature should also be acknowledged here (Mortensen,
1994; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). See also Cahuc and Zylbeberg (2004) for a thorough description of the
matching approach to labor markets.
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market, enhanced by the rule according to which a paper cannot be submitted to several journals
at the same time. He works out a paper allocation model, similar to an equilibrium search model,
and analyses the equilibria. The main result is that frictions in the market, leading to higher
delays in publication, could support an e¢ cient separating equilibrium where high-quality papers
are published by top-tier journals, and lower quality papers are published by second-tier journals.
Without providing a formal model, Pujol (2008) also acknowledges that journals are vertically
di¤erentiated, and, due to imperfect information, authors can sometimes target a too high quality
journal relatively to their work, thus bearing a high risk of referee-rejection. At di¤erence with
these existing studies, in our model journals have identical qualities. This is the price to pay for
developing an explicit dynamic analysis of the matching process that is not available elsewhere.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the main assumption. Section
3 presents the equilibrium and study its main properties. We present our conclusions in the last
section.
2 Main assumptions
2.1 Authors, papers and editors
At every period, each author writes one paper, and, following the standard rule in academic
publication, he submits it to only one journal. Submissions are uniformly distributed over the
existing journals. Each journal is run by one editor. Authors have no perfect information about
the editorial line of a journal and can target a wrong journal. Editors must decide whether to
have them published or not. The number of editors, denoted by E; is given. The number of
authors is denoted by A (with A  E). We assume that authors can freely enter or exit this
market, depending on their outside opportunities. Hence A can vary (and will be endogenously
determined).
The paper selection mechanism operates in two steps. In the rst step, the editor must decide
whether the paper matches the aim and scope of the journal. If the match is not successful, the
4
editor decides to desk-reject the paper. The author will keep on submitting it to other journals
until a correct match occurs. If the match is successful, the editor will send it to the referees for
an assessment of its quality. A paper sent to referees actually exits the submission process: after
the referees deliver their verdict, the paper is either published or withdrawn.
Hence, in the steady state, the total number of papers submitted for publication each period
does not vary. It is made up of the newly written papers (in number A) and all the papers written
at the previous periods that have not got yet a successful match. Let us denote the steady state
number of submissions by N and the probability for a submitted paper to match the editorial line
of a journal by 1  ; the steady state desk-rejection rate is . Then, the steady state number of
submitted papers per period is related to the number of new papers by a simple relationship:
N = A
1X
k=0
k =
A
1  : (1)
2.2 The matching function
We denote the per-period number of successful matches between authors and editors by M . We
assume that M can be written as a twice di¤erentiable function with the general form M =
M(E;N); with @M(; )=@E = ME > 0; and @M(; )=@N = MN > 0: The rationale behind these
properties is easy to grasp: on the one hand, for a given number of journal titles, the more papers
are submitted, the more papers per journal and the more of them should t any of these journals;
on the other hand, for a given number of papers, the more journal titles, the greater specialization
and the smaller will be chances to target a wrong outlet. Furthermore, this matching function
must comply with one important restriction: the number of matches cannot exceed the smallest
number between the number of papers: M(E;N)  N:
In this paper, in order to get an analytical solution, we will assume that the matching function
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takes the specic form:7
M(E;N) = EN1  with  2]0; 1[: (2)
The matching probability 1   is then:
1   = M(E;N)
N
=

E
N

=

E
A

(1  ) (3)
() 1   =

E
A
 
1 
: (4)
Hereafter, formula can be written in a more compact form if we denote by  = E=A the "degree
of accessibility" of the academic publication market (a higher  being representative of a an easier
path to publication for an author), with  2]0; 1[. The matching probability can be written:
1   =  1  (5)
Another interesting measure is the number of submissions per journal:
N
E
=
A=E
1   =
1
(1  ) = 
  11  > 1: (6)
2.3 The expected intertemporal utility of the scholar, W
As already mentioned, at each time period, the scholar writes one paper and he submits it for
publication to only one journal. Because of informational frictions in the publication market, he
will meet an editor interested in his work with probability (1   ): When an editor gets a paper
well-tted to his journal, he will proceed to an evaluation of the quality of the text through a
standard refereeing process. To keep the model as simple as possible, we consider that there are
only two possible outcomes of the refereeing process: the paper can either be referee-rejected with
the probability (1  p); or accepted with the probability p:8 Denoting by  the scholars discount
7 The model could be numerically solved for any function homogenous of degree one M(E; N) = M(E;N);
8. This property is intuitively appealing: indeed, doubling the number of papers and the number of titles, it is
reasonable to assume that the number of matches would double.
8 The structure of the model would not change if we consider a two stage evaluation, were we add a revise
and resubmit option, followed by accepted or rejected. Formulas would become more cumbersome due to the
compounded discount. See for a more powerful analysis of the paper selection process, Enger and Gans (1998),
Besancenot and Vranceanu (2008) or Heintzelman and Nocetti (2009).
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factor, his intertemporal expected utility prior to sending his paper to a journal is:
S = S + (1  ) f s+  [pWA + (1  p)WR]g : (7)
In this expression, the rst term is the expected gain if the match was unsuccessful; in this case,
that occurs with probability ; at the next period the scholar will re-submit his paper to another
journal and expect the same reward S.9 The second term is the expected payo¤ if the match
is successful (which happens with probability (1  )): the scholar pays the submission fee s and
waits for the editors decision. The latter takes advice from referees, then either rejects the paper,
which worth then WR; or accepts it, which worth then WA for its author
When a paper is referee-rejected, the author must decide if he will try to nd another suitable
journal for his article. For the sake of parsimony, we will consider here that after a motivated
rejection, the paper is denitively withdrawn from the publishing game by its author. Hence, the
expected utility of the author of a referee-rejected paper is: WR = 0:
Many theoretical and empirical analyses have shown that a scholars pay, promotion and tenure
decision depend to a large extent on his publication record (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Swidler
and Goldreyer, 1998; Swanson, 2004). Hence, we merely assume that the author gets a positive
intertemporal utility from publishing one additional paper: WA = u; with u > 0:10
Then equation (7) can be solved for an explicit value of S:
S =
(1  ) ( s+ pu)
1   : (8)
Denoting the cost of drafting a new paper by c, the net expected intertemporal value from writing
a paper can be written:
W = S   c
=
(1  ) ( s+ pu)
1     c (9)
9 Remember that when a paper is desk-rejected, the author will keep on trying to nd a suitable journal. He
will do so as long as the paper has not been accepted or rejected by a referee.
10 Here we assume that the utility of every new publication is constant. Paul and Rubin (1984) argue that, for
signaling motives, the value of the rst publications should be larger than the value of subsequent ones.
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We notice that the problem is meaningful only for W > 0. The intertemporal utility of the author
is a decreasing function in the submission fee s:
2.4 The expected intertemporal utility of the editor, V
At any time period, each editor gets N=E submissions. At a the rst stage of the selection process,
each paper is screened by the editor. Given the matching process dened here-above,M=E papers
match the aim and scope of the journal and will be send to referees; the remaining (N  M)=E
papers will be desk rejected. The e¤ort of screening one paper involves a cost g for the editor.
Denoting by VDR the expected utility of a desk rejected paper, and by VS the expected utility
of a paper sent to the referees, the expected intertemporal payo¤ of the editor (from being in the
publication market) can be written as:
V =  gN
E
+
M
E
VS +
N  M
E
VDR: (10)
The value of a desk-rejected paper is elementary VDR = 0: When the editor decides to send the
paper to referees, he will charge the author a submission fee s > 0. At the next period, he will
pay the referees an amount r  0 and, according to the refereesreports, he will either accept the
paper (and get the reward VA) or reject it (and receive VR). The expected utility VS of a paper
sent to the referees can be written:
VS = s+  [pVA + (1  p)VR   r] : (11)
The intertemporal utility of the editor from an accepted paper is VA = v and the intertemporal
utility of the author from a referee-rejected paper is VR = 0: Thus, the expected intertemporal
payo¤ of the editor (Eq.10) becomes:
V =  gN
E
+
M
E
VS
=
N
E

 g + M
N
[s+  (pv   r)]

=
N
E
f g + (1  ) [s+  (pv   r)]g : (12)
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where we recall that NE = 
  11  and (1  ) =  1  . The editors intertemporal surplus is
increasing with s.
3 Main relationships and the equilibrium
3.1 Author free entry condition and the s = () relationship
In general, people who can play the publication game are highly trained individuals who can use
their human capital for alternative activities. For instance, in many higher education institutions,
faculty members, at some stage of their career, choose to teach more hours in executive education
programmes or do administrative work. If the reward from academic publication increases, some
of them might be tempted to reduce their teaching or administration hours and do more research
(Fox and Milbourne, 1999; Taylor et al., 2006). Consulting or nice jobs in public administration
or international organizations are also accessible to many well trained scholars (Faria, 2001; 2002)
In our model, these outside opportunities provide the would-be author with a reservation
intertemporal utility level, denoted by W (with W > 0): Under free entry, new authors enter the
publication market as long as they expect that the intertemporal gain from this activity is larger
than W , and leave the market in the opposite case. In the steady state equilibrium, the expected
intertemporal utility W is driven to W . The condition W = W allows us to put forward a rst
relationship between the degree of accessibility,  = E=A; and the submission fee, s: Given the
denition of W (Eq. 9), we can write:
W = W
, (1  ) f s+ pug
1     c =
W
, s = pu    W + c h(1  )   1  + i : (13)
Denoting by  () = pu    W + c h(1  )   1  + i ; the last equation can be written in the
compact form:
s = () : (14)
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with @()@ > 0;
@2()
@2
< 0 and lim
!0
() =  1; (1) = pu   W + c : Given thatW+c = S such
as dened by Eq. (8); we can check that (1) > 0:
The graph of () is plotted in Figure 1:
1
s
q
F(q)
0
Dq>0
Dq<0
Figure 1: Author free-entry condition
Recall that authors intertemporal utility W is decreasing with s: All points above the line
s = () correspond to situations where the intertemporal gain of a scholar is lower than W , thus
scholars are attracted by non academic activities and exit the publication market. The number
of authors decreases and  increases. In turn, given (5), (1  ) increases and the probability of
desk rejection  declines.
Points below the line correspond to an authors intertemporal utility greater than W , thus
some new scholars decide to enter the publication market. A increases and  = E=A decreases
over time.
3.2 The rent sharing rule and the s = 	() relationship
In a normally functioning publication market, the representative author obtains from writing a
paper the intertemporal utility W and the representative editor gets from running his journal
the intertemporal utility V: With A authors and E editors in the market, the overall welfare 
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generated by the publication market is given by:
EV +AW = 
 (15)
How this total welfare is divided between the two types of players is a matter of social organization
of this special market, prevailing institutional arrangements and ultimately the balance of powers
between the two groups of players. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an in-depth
analysis of the surplus sharing mechanism. In the following we merely assume that editors gets a
share  of the total surplus while authors gets a share (1  ). In other words, we have:
EV = 

AW = (1  )

(16)
This surplus sharing rule allows us to write:
EV
AW
=

(1  ) () V =

(1  )
A
E
W: (17)
Given that W = W; this last equation implies:
V =

(1  )
A
E
W
() N
E
( g + (1  ) (s+  [pv   r])) = 
(1  )
A
E
W
() s = 
(1  )
W    [pv   r] + g  1  : (18)
Denoting by 	() = (1 ) W  [pv   r]+g 

1  ; the last equation can be written in the compact
form:
s = 	() (19)
with @	()@ < 0;
@	2()
@2
> 0; and lim
!0
	() = +1; 	(1) = (1 ) W    [pv   r] + g:
Figure 2 represents the graph of 	() :
Recall that editors intertemporal utility V is increasing with s: All points below the curve
s = 	() represent situations where editorsreward EV is too low relatively to scholarsutility
AW ; to restore the balance, the submission fee is expected to rise. All points above the curve
11
1s
q
Y(q)
0
Ds>0
Ds<0
Figure 2: The rent sharing agreement
s = 	() correspond to situations where the submission fee must decline to restore the socially
agreed balance of welfare shares.
3.3 The steady state equilibrium
An equilibrium solution is a pair (s; ) with s > 0 and  2]0; 1[ that simultaneously fullls equations
s = () > 0 (the free entry condition, Eq. 14) and s = 	() > 0 (the surplus sharing condition,
Eq. 19). Such an equilibrium is represented as the point Z in Figure 3.
The equilibrium  is implicitly dened by 	() =  () : We can obtain its explicit form:
	() = ()
() pu    W + c h + (1  )   1  i = 
(1  )
W    [pv   r] + g  1 
()  =
24   W + c (1  ) + g
p (u+ v)   (r + c) 

 + 1 

W
35
1 

: (20)
The equilibrium matching probability results from equation (5):
1   =  1  = (1  )
 
W + c

+ g
p (u+ v)   (r + c) 

 + (1 )

W
: (21)
12
The number of submissions per journal (Eq. ??) can also be inferred in a straightforward way:
N
E
=  
1
1  =
24p (u+ v)   (r + c) 

 + 1 

W 
W + c

(1  ) + g
35
1

: (22)
Finally, the equilibrium submission fee is:
s =

(1  )
W    [pv   r] + g  1 
() s = 
(1  )
W    [pv   r] + g
p (u+ v)   (r + c) 

 + (1 )

W 
W + c

(1  ) + g
() s =
 
W + c

(1  )
h

(1 ) W    (pv   r)
i
+ g
 
pu  c  W  
W + c

(1  ) + g : (23)
A single equilibrium exists under the necessary and su¢ cient condition:
	(1) < (1), 
(1  )
W    [pv   r] + g < pu    W + c (24)
, 1
(1  )
W + r + g + c < p (u+ v) : (25)
Chances that this condition is fullled are better if direct and opportunity cost of each player are
relatively small, or if the utility from publishing a paper for either the author or the editor is large
enough.
The implicit dynamics represented by the arrows in Figure 3 show that the model presents
a Cobweb structure. A su¢ cient condition for the equilibrium to be locally stable is that the
curve () to be steeper than 	() (oscillations dampen around the equilibrium). It turns out that
[ds=d] >   [ds=d]	 ,
 
W + c

(1  ) > g: Chances to have this condition fullled are better
if the cost of managing papers by the editor is relative low, and if authors direct (c) and indirect
opportunity cost
 
W

of writing papers is large.
3.4 Properties of the equilibrium
We can now analyze the impact of changes in the main parameters on the equilibrium values of
s and . For so doing, we have to take into account the impact of parameter changes on the
two curves, s = () and s = 	(). Table 1 presents the partial derivatives @	(; i)=@i and
13
1s
q
Y(q)
0
F(q)
W,r,g,d
p,v
p,u
W,c
Z
_
_
Figure 3: Equilibrium in the academic publication market
@(; i)=@i; for i 2 fr; c; p; v; u; g; W; g: The signs of these derivatives can be inferred without
ambiguity:
i @( )=@i @	( )=@i
r 0 
c  

(1  )   1  + 

0
p u  v
v 0  p
u p 0
g 0  

1 
W  

(1  )   1  + 


(1 )
 0 1(1 )2 W
Table 1. Various partial derivatives
We represent in Figure 3 how the two curves move in response to positive variations of the
parameters r; c; p; v; u; g; W; ;  by the respective arrows.
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Table 2 indicates the sign of the variation in the equilibrium values of  and s with respect
to variations in parameters such as indicated by comparative statics with the two relationships in
Figure 3 (or directly through Eq. 20 and Eq. 23).
r c p v u g W 
 + +    + + +
s +  ?  + + ? +
Table 2. Impact of parameter change on s and 
In the last few years, in many regions of the globe (mainly Europe and Asia), governments are
implementing reforms aiming at strengthening ties between academicscompensation and their
research performance (Groot and Garcia-Valderrama, 2006). In Europe, substantial momentum
to the reform of higher education and R&D systems was brought by the Lisbon Summit of 2000,
where leaders of the EU member countries acknowledged that lasting growth can be achieved only
if the performance in these two areas improves in a substantial way. At the school playing level,
the emergence of ubiquitous rankings is setting additional pressure on deans to reward research
performance more aggressively. The direct consequence of these policy changes is an increase in
scholarsutility from publishing a paper (u). According to our analysis, when the net utility u of
the author from publishing a paper increases, their expected intertemporal gain W goes up. New
scholars are thus attracted by the publication market and start submitting papers,  declines.
The rise in the number of submissions also presents an adverse e¤ect on the editorsutility as it
increases the editorsoverall screening cost that is not fully compensated by the increased number
of published papers. To restore the agreed shares of surplus, the submission fees must increase
in order to o¤set the relative decline in editorssurplus V . This partially o¤sets the initial rise
in authors intertemporal gain W: In the steady state, at the term of the adjustment process,
the submission fee (s) has increased, the ratio between editors and authors has decreased and,
consequently, the number of submissions per journal have increased. These implications of the
model are much in line with the observed stylized facts. Indeed, as mentioned in the Introduction,
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in the last few years the number of submitted papers has increased dramatically, which prompted
editors to implement "defense strategies" such as the systematic recourse to desk-rejection or the
introduction of large submission fees.
The model suggests that some factors, such as a lower probability of the referees accepting
papers, a higher writing cost or an increased Editorspower might o¤set the former trends.
For instance, Ellison (2002) argues that over time referees tend to become more demanding. If
the probability p of accepting a paper is reduced, both the editors and the scholars can expect a
deterioration of their respective surpluses. If some authors leave the publication market,  = E=A
goes up and and the probability of desk rejection declines. At the same time, a smaller number
of submissions entails a smaller editorial processing cost. Depending on the relative strength of
the two e¤ects (on the one hand, a smaller number of publications per journal pushes down the
editors expected reward, on the other hand, the falling number of submissions brings down the
editorial cost), editors would see their surplus raising or not and would adjust submission fees
accordingly.
In the same line of reasoning, in order to comply with a tougher publishing norm, authors might
have to bear larger writing costs (c). This would also push some authors out of the publication
market and help containing the raise in submission fees.
Finally, one could notice that traditionally the publication of academic papers was driven by a
concern for serving the academic community. In the early years of the 20th century, most academic
journals were published by national and regional associations of scholars. Over time, prot-driven
businesses such as the major publishing houses (Elsevier, Springer, Sage, Blackwell, etc.) have
gradually increased their participation to the academic publication market. Such institutional
change could be responsible for a change in the surplus sharing rule in favour of the editors. If
the balance of power between editors and authors changes such as a bigger share of the surplus
goes to editors ( goes up), the submission fee must increase. In turn, since W < W; some
scholars leave the publication market, the ratio  = E=A will increase and so does the matching
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probability (1  ). Given that it becomes now easier for authors to have their papers published,
that evolution partially o¤sets the initial increase in fees. At the term of the adjustment process,
both s and  would have risen.
4 Conclusion
For many years, the ow of papers submitted for publication in academic journals in business
administration and economics has been increasing steadily. The number of journal titles is also
growing, but at smaller pace. The resulting journal congestion is at the origin of substantial
frustration and criticism on behalf of both authors and editors. In this context, editors are testing
new strategies aimed to preserve the quality of their journals and attract the best contributions.
Among these new intriguing policies, one can mention the generalization of (large) submission fees,
the lengthier response time and the implementation of desk-rejection, dened as the possibility for
the editor to decide on his own whether a paper matches or not the aim and scope of the journal.
This paper aimed at providing a dynamic model of the academic publication market where
scholars supply and journals demand papers. In our model, due to imperfect information, scholars
can sometimes target a wrong journal in terms of editorial line. The key and original modeling
device is a paper-to-journal matching function, relating the number of successful matches to the
numbers of authors and journals in the market, inspired from the classical matching model in
labor economics (Pissarides, 2000). If a paper overcomes this rst test, then the editor will send
it to referees who ultimately decide whether to publish it or not.
The model presents a single equilibrium, dened as a situation where both editors and au-
thors implement their optimal publishing strategies, given the matching process and the socially
determined share of rent between the two groups of players. Parameter changes have in general
unambiguous consequences on the main endogenous variables: the ratio between the number of
authors and editors, the number of submissions per editor, the desk rejection rate and the sub-
mission fee. In the light of our analysis, the recent trends in the market for publication such as
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the simultaneous increase in submission fees and number of submissions can be interpreted as
a direct consequence of the rise in authorsutility from publishing a paper, itself related to the
recent institutional changes in the academic publication market.
Like the elementary version of the labor market matching model, our simple model cannot
pretend to provide an exhaustive picture of the academic publication market, but can be seen as a
good starting point for more powerful analyses, where the introduction of heterogenous agents or
a more active role for editors in the paper selection process could bring the model closer to reality.
However, a dynamic model has its own merit, since it can describe in a more thorough way a market
characterized by huge ows of "commodities", such as the market for academic publications. It
also provides policymakers with a better understanding of transmission mechanisms, that should
not be neglected in when working out any reform of the higher education system.
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